Handling Persistent States in Process Checkpoint/Restart Mechanisms for HPC Systems by Riteau, Pierre et al.
Handling Persistent States in Process
Checkpoint/Restart Mechanisms for HPC Systems
Pierre Riteau, Adrien Le`bre, Christine Morin
To cite this version:
Pierre Riteau, Adrien Le`bre, Christine Morin. Handling Persistent States in Process Check-
point/Restart Mechanisms for HPC Systems. [Research Report] RR-6765, INRIA. 2008, pp.16.
<inria-00346745>
HAL Id: inria-00346745
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00346745
Submitted on 12 Dec 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
appor t  

de  r ech er ch e
IS
S
N
0
2
4
9
-6
3
9
9
IS
R
N
IN
R
IA
/R
R
--
6
7
6
5
--
F
R
+
E
N
G
Thème NUM
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE ET EN AUTOMATIQUE
Handling Persistent States in Process
Checkpoint/Restart Mechanisms for HPC Systems
Pierre Riteau — Adrien Lèbre — Christine Morin
N° 6765
Décembre 2008

Centre de recherche INRIA Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique
IRISA, Campus universitaire de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex
Téléphone : +33 2 99 84 71 00 — Télécopie : +33 2 99 84 71 71
Handling Persistent States in Process
Checkpoint/Restart Mechanisms for HPC
Systems∗
Pierre Riteau† , Adrien Lèbre‡ , Christine Morin†
Thème NUM — Systèmes numériques
Équipe-Projet PARIS
Rapport de recherche n° 6765 — Décembre 2008 — 16 pages
Abstract: Computer clusters are today the reference architecture for high-
performance computing. The large number of nodes in these systems induces
a high failure rate. This makes fault tolerance mechanisms, e.g. process check-
point/restart, a required technology to effectively exploit clusters. Most of the
process checkpoint/restart implementations only handle volatile states and do
not take into account persistent states of applications, which can lead to inco-
herent application restarts. In this paper, we introduce an efficient persistent
state checkpoint/restoration approach that can be interconnected with a large
number of file systems. To avoid the performance issues of a stable support
relying on synchronous replication mechanisms, we present a failure resilience
scheme optimized for such persistent state checkpointing techniques in a dis-
tributed environment. First evaluations of our implementation in the kDFS
distributed file system show the negligible performance impact of our proposal.
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Gestion des états persistants dans un mécanisme
de sauvegarde/reprise de processus pour une
grappe de calcul haute-performance
Résumé : Les grappes sont aujourd’hui implantées comme architecture de
référence dans le domaine du calcul intensif. Les problèmes de défaillances
dûs au grand nombre de nœuds de ces systèmes font que des méthodes de
tolérance aux fautes, telles que les approches de type sauvegarde/reprise de
processus, doivent être utilisées. La plupart de ces mécanismes se concentrent
sur la sauvegarde des états volatils et ne tiennent pas compte du contenu des
fichiers manipulés par les applications, pouvant ainsi entraîner une incohérence
lors de la reprise. Dans ce rapport de recherche, nous proposons dans un premier
temps une approche générique de sauvegarde/restauration de fichiers suscepti-
ble de s’interconnecter avec un large panel de systèmes de fichiers. Pour éviter
les problèmes de performance d’un support stable fondé sur des mécanismes
de réplication synchrone, nous présentons un schéma de résistance aux fautes
optimisé pour l’utilisation de ces techniques de sauvegarde/reprise dans un en-
vironnement distribué. Les premières évaluations obtenues sur une mise en
œuvre dans le système de fichiers kDFS montrent l’impact négligeable sur les
performances de notre proposition.
Mots-clés : sauvegarde/restauration d’états persistants, mécanismes de sauve-
garde/reprise de processus, systèmes de fichiers distribués, architectures dis-
tribués, haute-performance
Handling Persistent States in Process Checkpoint/Restart Mechanisms 3
1 Introduction
Today, computer clusters are by far the most popular way to build HPC sys-
tems [1]. Being made of hundreds or thousands of nodes, these systems can
present strong reliability problems. The failure rate increasing with the number
of components, fault tolerance techniques must be used to effectively exploit
these systems.
One of these techniques is backward error recovery based on process check-
point/restart. It consists in saving periodically the state of a running appli-
cation and storing this state to stable storage, thereby creating a checkpoint.
This checkpoint can be used after a failure to restore the application state and
restart it, thus avoiding the need to restart the application from scratch.
While many process checkpoint/restart systems have been proposed [13] in
the past, most of them only checkpoint volatile states of processes (mainly pro-
cessor registers and memory content). However, if the checkpointed application
uses files, restarting from a checkpoint not considering file content may create an
incoherent state and thus lead to unexpected behavior. This makes persistent
state checkpointing (i.e. checkpointing of file state) a required part for a fully
transparent process checkpoint/restart service.
The few process checkpoint/restart systems implementing persistent state
checkpointing rely on an existing stable support, traditionally implemented with
RAID techniques [10] using synchronous replication or redundancy. The main
drawback of such techniques is their impact on performance, especially when
used in a distributed environment. To our best knowledge, no process check-
point/restart mechanism considering both persistent state saving and stable
storage built on a distributed environment has yet been proposed.
In this paper, we present a persistent state checkpoint/restoration system
taking into account both issues. Firstly, we propose a high-performance and
portable file versioning framework that can be used to save persistent state of
processes. To provide high performance, data I/O overhead must be mitigated.
Therefore we use a copy-on-write scheme in our framework. For portability, our
proposal leverages native file systems in a stackable approach [20]. This means
it can be easily deployed in existing environments, both on local file systems
(ext2, SGI’s XFS, etc.) and distributed file systems. Secondly, we describe an
efficient replication model creating stable storage in a distributed environment.
This stable storage can be used by our persistent state checkpoint mechanism
to reduce I/O overhead compared to traditional RAID approaches.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents existing persistent
state checkpointing methods and their respective features. Section 3 focuses on
the design of our persistent state checkpointing approach. Section 4 presents
performance results of the prototype we developed. Related work is addressed
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 gives some perspectives and Section 7 concludes
this paper.
2 Available File Checkpointing Methods
To be able to restart applications in a coherent state after a failure, persistent
state should be saved along with volatile state. This involves saving the state
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of files used by an application at the time of a checkpoint. We will refer to this
as file versioning.
Some earlier implementations of persistent state checkpointing [19] used a
shadow copy technique: a copy of open files is made at checkpoint time. This
technique is not suitable as soon as the size of the files becomes important,
which is typically the case in HPC applications (both for storage space and
performance impact reasons).
A second technique is undo logs [18]. The concept of undo logs is to keep
a log of modified data. When a modification operation is issued, original data
is copied in a log. The log can be used after a failure to restore the file to its
state at the time of the checkpoint. The main drawback of this approach is
that the system needs to issue additional read and write operations (to copy
existing data in the log) for each modification operation, which can decrease
performance.
Another technique is copy-on-write used in some file systems, for example
WAFL from NetApp [6]. It consists in sharing common blocks between several
versions of a file and allocating new blocks only when they are modified. This
technique is used both for offering snapshot features and keeping the file system
coherent (modification operations work on a copy of the index data structures
until a single block referencing the complete file system can be atomically re-
placed).
Snapshot features of these file systems could be used for checkpointing pur-
poses, but it is not very convenient: the whole file system is checkpointed at once,
which can significantly impact performance. For a process checkpoint/restart
service, we would like to have a checkpoint granularity restricted to the set of
files used by the checkpointed process, not the whole file system.
In a way similar to copy-on-write, buffering [12] keeps modified data in
memory until a new checkpoint is made, and commits the modifications at
checkpoint time. However, committing atomically the modifications to disk,
which is not covered by the authors in their paper, involves using a technique
similar to the other ones presented in this section.
3 Proposal Overview
To checkpoint the persistent state of an application, our framework saves the
states of files used by this application. File state is composed of two elements:
file metadata (owner, permissions, etc.), stored in a structure commonly called
inode, and file data (file contents). To store these two elements on the native
file system, we exploit two kinds of files: metadata files and content files.
3.1 File Metadata Versioning
Meta information for a file (size, owner, permissions, timestamps, etc.) con-
sumes about 50 bytes of disk space. Because of this low space usage, we decided
to make a complete copy of metadata at each checkpoint, storing them in meta-
data files.
On the first modification of a file after a checkpoint, a new metadata file
is created. This metadata file is identified by a version number equal to the
last checkpoint identifier + 1 (because this metadata file will be part of the
INRIA
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time
A0 B0
C1 D1
A2 C2 .content2
.content1
.content0
Figure 1: A view of content files after several checkpoints.
The following scenario creates this pattern of content files: write pages A0 and B0,
checkpoint, write pages C1 and D1, checkpoint, and finally write pages A2 and C2.
Filled areas correspond to empty areas of the sparse files.
next checkpoint). When an application is rolled back to a checkpoint identified
by the version number i, the file system accesses metadata identified by the
highest number less than or equal to i, which was metadata at the time of
the checkpoint (metadata is identified by a number less than i when the file
remained unmodified between the checkpoints i− 1 and i).
3.2 File Data Versioning
In order to reduce the overhead of versioning, file data is handled in a copy-on-
write fashion with a page size granularity (in the Linux VFS a page is the basic
amount of data in an operation on file content).
On the first modification of a file after a checkpoint, a new content file is
created. Like in the metadata case, it is identified by a version number X: this
file is named .contentX. Several options are available to store new data in this
file. In order to avoid maintaining a mapping of logical addresses with physical
addresses, new data is written in this file using the logical position. This creates
a sparse file. On most native file systems, disk usage of sparse files corresponds
to the size of data written in them. An example of content files is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Unfortunately, this is not enough to allow versioning of file state: when
reading an empty area in a sparse file, zero bytes are returned. It is not possible
to distinguish an empty area from an area that was written to with zero bytes.
Thus, our model stores another information: which content file stores a
specific version of a page of the file. This information is kept in extent-like
structures, referring to a contiguous range of objects [8]. This allows using a
single structure to reference a number of contiguous pages, reducing space usage
to store this information when many contiguous pages share a common version
number. For a fast search, insertion and deletion of these extents, they are
stored in a B-tree sorted by the starting page number. A new B-tree is created
at each checkpoint, so there is one B-tree per version of the file. An example of
B-trees along with the corresponding content files is shown in Figure 2.
This architecture allows checkpointed file content to be retained in the file
system even if the application overwrites it. If an application removes a file,
the parent directory is versioned in the same way. The metadata and content
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(file is 2 pages, 8 KB)
1 ; 1 ; V0
2 ; 1 ; V2 3 ; 1 ; V1
A0 B0 C1 D1
A0 B0
.content0
time
.content1
.content2
C1 D1
C2A2
0 ; 1 ; V2
B−tree of checkpoint 00 ; 2 ; V0
A0 B0.content0
B−tree of checkpoint 1
.content0 .content1
(2 new pages were appended)
B−tree of checkpoint 2
(pages A and C were modified)
0 ; 2 ; V0 2 ; 2 ; V1
Figure 2: B-trees and content files in the scenario of Figure 1.
An extent structure stores three values : starting page number, number of contiguous
pages, and version.
INRIA
Handling Persistent States in Process Checkpoint/Restart Mechanisms 7
files for the deleted file are not removed: they can be used when a process is
restarted.
When a volatile state checkpoint is deleted, the corresponding persistent
state is not useful anymore, and should be removed from the file system. While
a block model would allow us to release unused data by freeing the correspond-
ing blocks, the plain files we exploit must be accessed using the standard file
interface. However, the POSIX API does not provide a way to remove part of
a file, except when it is located at the end (in this case we can use truncate).
Overwriting data with zero bytes does not make the file sparse again on the
ext2/ext3 file systems, and probably most others (it could be possible to imple-
ment this feature in a file system but it would break our portability goal).
A way to solve this problem would be to replicate the block model using
small files, but this raises two issues. First, choosing the best file size is diffi-
cult: it depends on the application file access pattern. Second, using many small
files on the native file system for each versioned file creates a large number of
inodes, making fsck longer to scan and repair the file system, wasting disk
space (although an inode is small, it still takes some place on the disk), poten-
tially hitting the limit on the number of inodes, and more generally impacting
performance.
To solve this issue, we copy still-used pages from the content file to remove
to a temporary sparse file, and then replace the content file by this temporary
file. This can be expensive, but since checkpoint removal is not a high priority
operation (it can be done in the background or when the system is idle), this
is not a major issue. However it should be noted that a downside of keeping
old content files for pages still in use is that the number of content files grows
over time. A cleaner functionality (fsck-like) could be added to copy still-used
pages to a more recent content file and fix the corresponding references in the
B-trees.
3.3 Stability of Checkpoint Data
Data retained by a process checkpoint mechanism must be saved on stable
storage: when failures happen, checkpointed process states need to be accessible
to be able to restart applications.
Most existing persistent state checkpointing systems do not take into ac-
count this issue and assume an external subsystem solves it. They typically
use a central NFS server for file storage, which is assumed to be stable using
traditional redundancy techniques such as RAID [10].
In the context of a distributed file system where several nodes are used in
parallel to store data, fault tolerance must be a feature of the file system stack
in order to provide a truly stable support.
A straightforward solution would be, for instance, to use synchronous repli-
cation (similar to RAID1) at network level, as illustrated in Figure 3. However,
this approach has a serious drawback: duplicating writes increases the load on
network and disks, potentially decreasing performance. Moreover, if the cluster
runs applications which are not checkpointed (e.g. applications with real-time
constraints for which it makes no sense to restart at a previous state), this could
decrease their performance.
In our context of an HPC cluster designed to execute applications reliably,
our goal is not making file data resilient to failure but running applications
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A2
write(A1) write(A2)
A0 A0
Nodes
Disks
write(A0)
A1 A2A1
Figure 3: Multiple write operations using a replication model at the network
level.
Page A is modified three times with versions A0, A1, and A2. A synchronous
replication model sends data over the network for each write operation.
successfully while minimizing lost time in case of failure. When a crash hap-
pens, applications are restarted from a recent checkpoint. All file modifications
realized since this checkpoint are not used. Because a synchronous replication
mechanism provides fault tolerance for this kind of data, it adds I/O overhead
without any benefit.
The model we propose consists in replicating file state on a remote node
only at checkpoint time. This design, based on a periodic replication, is close
to the one suggested for disaster recovery of enterprise data [11]. Coupling this
kind of replication system with process checkpoint/restart enables to provide
fault tolerance for HPC applications. When a checkpoint is taken, our model
replicates data created or changed by this process since the last checkpoint,
if this data is still valid (i.e. not overwritten or deleted). For example, in
case of multiple writes to the same page of a file, only the last version needs
to be replicated, as illustrated in Figure 4. If data is written and invalidated
between two checkpoints, it does not need to be replicated. This means that
files created and deleted between two checkpoints are not transferred over the
network. This can be particularly interesting for applications doing large data
I/O on temporary files that are then removed. This replication can also be done
in the background to keep a low performance impact on the network and the
disks.
When a node fails, checkpoint data stored on it can be accessed through the
replica. To stay fault tolerant, at least two copies of checkpoint data should
always be available in the cluster. In case of failure, a new replica should be
initialized. Multiple replicas could be used to cope with several failures. In
this case, quorum based mechanisms could improve performance by avoiding
synchronizing all replicas at each checkpoint. Discussing the pros and cons of
different replica management strategies is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
Our proposal has been implemented in kDFS [7], a fully symmetric Linux file
system developed in the XtreemOS [4] and Kerrighed [17] projects. kDFS al-
lows to aggregate storage devices on cluster compute nodes in a single global
file system, without requiring a dedicated metadata server. It also strives to in-
INRIA
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Replication
A2 A2 A2
A0
Nodes
Disks
write(A0)
A1
write(A1)
write(A2)
the checkpoint)
(triggered by
Figure 4: Multiple write operations with our replication model.
In this scenario, fewer data is sent over the network compared to RAID1 (c.f.
Figure 3). Only page A2 needs to be sent over the network and written to the disk of
the remote node.
terface with cluster services, e.g. the scheduler, the process checkpoint/restart
mechanisms, etc., to improve performance.
kDFS uses an underlying file system to store file metadata and file data.
One metadata file and one content file are created on the native file system for
each kDFS file. We took advantage of this behavior and extended this model
to use several files, one of each kind for each version, as described in Section 3.
4.1 Analysis of Versioning Overhead
The goal of the performance evaluation of our model is to measure I/O overhead
when using persistent state checkpointing. We used the Bonnie++ [3] bench-
mark to evaluate our implementation. A full run of Bonnie++ is composed of a
number of steps involving write operations, read operations, random seeks and
file creations/accesses/deletions.
Benchmark runs were performed on a cluster of four machines with 2.66 GHz
Intel Core 2 Duo processors, 2 GB of RAM and 160 GB S-ATA hard disk drives.
The four nodes were running Bonnie++ in parallel, using kDFS to exploit their
local storage devices.
Results of the writing step are presented in Figure 5. Write performance is
quite similar with or without checkpointing. Only the per block writing step
shows slightly more performance without checkpointing. The rewriting step
involves reading, modifying data, using lseek and finally writing modified data
on disk. Data modification and lseek operations do not create any disk access.
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Figure 5: Write performance in Bonnie++.
Write performance without checkpoint (infinite period) is compared to performance
with several checkpoint periods between 10 and 300 seconds.
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Figure 6: Read performance in Bonnie++.
These read operations are performed on files created by the previous write step (i.e.
read operations are performed on already versioned files).
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Figure 7: File creation/deletion performance in Bonnie++.
Results of the reading step are presented in Figure 6. In this case read
performance numbers are again similar with or without checkpointing.
Due to space limitations, we do not present random seek results. Our exper-
iments showed that, like write and read performance, random seek performance
is similar whether or not file versioning is used.
Results of file creations/deletions are presented in Figure 7. Only random file
creation and deletion results are presented. Other operations were too fast for
Bonnie++ to report quantitative values. These results show that file creation
performance is not affected by checkpointing. In the deletion step performance
is slightly better with checkpointing since data is not freed from the file system
(c.f. Section 3.2).
4.2 Analysis of Delayed Replication Performance
Our replication model is under development. Its performance should greatly
depend on the access pattern of the application and on the checkpoint period. To
get an idea of its performance against traditional RAID techniques, we simulated
our model using the behavior of the Bonnie++ benchmark in the read/write
steps.
Several files with a total size of 4 GB are used in these steps. The first
step is per-character sequential output, using putc. Since the standard output
uses a buffer, each putc operation does not create a call to the system call
write. With a 8 KB buffer, write is called 524,288 times. The second step is
per-block sequential output. Bonnie++ using 16 KB blocks, it creates 262,144
write operations. The third step is a per-block rewrite of the file using read,
lseek and write, which creates again 262,144 calls to write. The two following
steps only perform reading operations. Finally, the last step, random seeks, does
8,000 write operations on 16 KB blocks. After all these steps are performed,
files are deleted. This information is summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 and Figure 8 compare the size of data sent over the network using
a traditional RAID1 replication or our model, while changing the checkpoint
period.
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Bonnie++
step
Number of
write opera-
tions
Size of writ-
ten data
Per byte write 524,288 4 GB
Per block
write
262,144 4 GB
Rewrite 262,144 4 GB
Per byte read 0 0
Per block read 0 0
Random seeks 8,000 125 MB
Table 1: Bonnie++ file operation statistics.
File creations/accesses/deletions are left out in order to only study large data I/O.
Checkpoint
period
Size of data sent over the network
with RAID1 with our
model
Period: 1 step
12.12 GB
12.12 GB
Period: 2
steps
8.12 GB
Period: 3
steps
4.12 GB
Period: full
run
0 bytes
Table 2: Size of data sent over the network using RAID1 and our replication
model.
With RAID1, the number of write operations and the size of data sent over
the network is always the same regardless of the checkpoint period. This can
be explained by the fact that every write from the application is sent over the
network to the mirror.
Being synchronized with the process checkpoint mechanism, our model sends
modifications to the replica only when a checkpoint is taken. When pages in the
file are overwritten, a lower checkpoint frequency can reduce both the number
of write operations and the size of data sent over the network.
Finally, when files are created, modified and then deleted between two check-
points (as it is the case when a checkpoint is performed only after a complete
Bonnie++ run), no data is sent over the network for these files.
5 Related Work
Most of the work related to our file versioning model was covered in Section 2.
One related system interesting to mention is Versionfs [9] which uses the same
concept of sparse files as our framework. However the versioning model used
by Versionfs is similar to undo logs, which by design can present performance
issues because of useless data copy (c.f. Section 2)
INRIA
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Figure 8: Size of data sent over the network using RAID1 and our replication
model.
Checkpoint frequency is variable. In the RAID1 case, the amount of data sent over
the network does not change since this mechanism does not take into account the
checkpoint frequency.
The rest of this section focuses on presenting contributions related to the
replication model we presented in Section 3.3. Besides asynchronous replication
strategies similar to this model [11], several approaches have been proposed to
reduce the performance impact of mirroring persistent data to provide fault
tolerance, both in local and distributed contexts.
In AFRAID [14], a scheme similar to RAID5 is used but the parity informa-
tion is not written synchronously with the data. Instead, non-volatile memory
is used to keep track of stripes having outdated parity blocks. The parity blocks
are updated later, exploiting idle time. This approach improves write perfor-
mance by temporarily lowering failure resilience. The authors suggest that, if
the number of unprotected RAID stripes is kept low, the probability of losing
data is very small, usually smaller than failure rate on single-point-of-failure
components like NVRAM caches.
In the Expand parallel file system [2], each file can have its own fault toler-
ance policy (no fault tolerance, replication, parity based redundancy, etc.). This
can be seen as similar, however more powerful, to the difference we make be-
tween files involved in a checkpoint (which are replicated) and other files (which
are not). This kind of behavior enables to reduce the cost of checkpointing
compared to a system where all files are replicated without considering whether
or not the application using them is being checkpointed.
6 Future Works
6.1 Checkpoint Replication in Grids
A main trend in the high-performance computing communities is the federation
of clusters to create grids. These new architectures can be used to increase
access to computing power and storage space. Compared to clusters, grids have
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much higher constraints with regard to network performance, especially network
latency.
In this context, reducing the number of writes over the network is very
important. Traditional approaches use a full replication scheme. All files are
replicated [15], whether or not they are used by checkpointed applications, and
all modifications are replicated synchronously. With our approach, only files
belonging to persistent state checkpoints are replicated, and modifications are
replicated only if they are retained in checkpoints. This enables to reduce net-
work congestion and improve global usage of the grid.
6.2 Integration with Existing Process Checkpoint/Restart
Frameworks
Our proposal only handles checkpointing of persistent states. To be used by
HPC systems it must be integrated with a volatile state checkpoint/restart
framework. Our system could be interfaced with a standard volatile process
checkpoint/restart mechanism like Berkeley Lab Checkpoint/Restart [5], or with
the checkpoint/restart service present in Kerrighed [16]. The integration be-
tween the two frameworks should be made in a transparent way so that appli-
cations do not have to be modified to use the new persistent state checkpoint
capabilities.
6.3 Integration with Other Cluster Services
Integration with other cluster services could also improve performance. Coordi-
nating the process checkpoint/restart system with the scheduler would allow for
example to restart an application on the node used for mirroring. This would
enable to use data stored locally instead of using the network to access remote
data.
Another useful interaction between the process checkpoint/restart service
and the scheduler would be the selection of nodes used for data replication.
They should be chosen so that the impact on performance is minimal. For
example the scheduler could monitor I/O activity to select the best nodes to
use for the replication.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a persistent state checkpointing framework that can be used
to coherently restart applications using files.
The first part of this mechanism is an efficient and portable file versioning
mechanism that can be implemented above a large number of existing file sys-
tems. We showed through experimentation with a standard I/O benchmark
that the performance impact of this mechanism is negligible.
The second part of our framework is a replication model in a distributed en-
vironment taking advantage of the usage of process checkpoint/restart to only
replicate relevant data. Depending on the file access pattern of the application
and on the checkpoint frequency, using this model can significantly reduce the
amount of data sent over the network. This enables increased I/O performance
INRIA
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compared to a traditional synchronous replication strategy. This model is par-
ticularly interesting in the context of grid computing where network constraints
are several orders of magnitude higher than in a cluster.
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